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Abstract Psychological research into children’s sensitivity to testimony has
primarily focused on their ability to judge the likely reliability of speakers. However,
verbal testimony is only one means by which children learn from others. We review
recent research exploring children’s early social referencing and imitation, as well as
their sensitivity to speakers’ knowledge, beliefs, and biases, to argue that children
treat information and informants with reasonable scepticism. As children’s
understanding of mental states develops, they become ever more able to critically
evaluate whether to believe new information.
When learning about the social and physical, one of the most valuable sources of
information is other people. The ability to learn from others brings great advantages,
allowing us to gain knowledge without relying exclusively on our own experience.
Unfortunately we also run the risk of acquiring information that is inaccurate: people
can give poor information when they are mistaken, ignorant, or being deliberately
deceitful. To maximally benefit from information given by others, we need to
evaluate the likely truth of what we are told.
The problem of assessing the truth of what we are told is particularly significant
in childhood, when we are presented with large amounts of new information that we
cannot check independently. Philosophers have speculated on the extent to which
children depend on the truthfulness of adults and others in learning languages and
finding their way around the world generally. Commenting on Michael Dummett’s
views (e.g. Dummett 1973) Donald Davidson (1984) has argued that children cannot
depend on others’ truthfulness:
Sometimes it is suggested that a language could never be learned except in an
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skeptical ..., partly because so much language learning takes place during
games, in hearing stories, and in pretence, and partly because the acquisition of
language cannot to such an extent depend on our luck in having truthful, sober,
assertive playmates and parents (p.274).
If Davidson is right, effective cultural transmission demands that children cannot
simply accept what they are told but must decide whether to believe others in ways
that reliably result in them gaining knowledge.
Here we argue that children do not simply accept what they are told. From a
very early age, children selectively reject both statements and informants as
unreliable. Such rejections are supported by the children’s own developing
understanding of others’ mental lives. As they become better able to judge an
informant’s past accuracy, knowledge state, and biases, children bring these
factors to bear in their judgments of who and what to believe. Evidence that
children evaluate both potential informants and individual statements comes from
social referencing, denials of false statements, and imitation, as well as their
tracking of speaker knowledge, beliefs, biases and errors.
1 Social Referencing
Infants’ sensitivity to the plausibility of sources of information is evident in their
use of others’ reactions. When confronted with an ambiguous situation, infants
look to others to see how they should behave, a behaviour known as social
referencing. Even when exploring the reactions of others, infants do not use the
information indiscriminately but evaluate whether to accept it. For example,
children are more likely to accept information from a trusted source; when a
novel ambiguous object, a remote-controlled black spider, was introduced to 14-
month-olds who were in a room with either their mother or a stranger, children
were more likely to respond appropriately to their mother’s reactions of fear or
of happiness than they were to respond to the stranger’s reactions (Zarbatany and
Lamb 1985). That is, they considered the source of the information when deciding
whether to accept it.
In addition to judging sources of information, children’s social referencing
shows that they are sensitive to the plausibility of information. Infants are more
likely to accept information that does not contradict what they know. In a slope-
walking task, 18-month-old children faced a sloping walkway, with their mother
at the bottom. Mothers offered either encouraging information (e.g., clapping and
encouraging their children to walk down the slope) or discouraging information
(e.g., wagging their fingers, saying “no”, or “you’ll fall”). Children ignored
negative social information when the slopes were clearly easy to walk down, and
they ignored encouraging social information when the slopes were clearly too
difficult. When it was unclear to the children whether they could successfully
walk down the walkway, however, they accepted the instructions from their
mother, attempting the walk when given positive information, and refusing when
being discouraged (Tamis-LeMonda et al. 2008). The same type of sensitivity was
shown by 12-month-old children, who crossed a ‘cliff’ covered with plexiglass
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more often when their mother signalled positive emotions (joy or interest) than
when she signalled negatively (fear or anger) but ignored these signals when it was
clear that the cliff was safe to cross (Sorce et al. 1985). In these studies, infants did
not automatically accept the information from their parents. Rather, they accepted
it only when the information did not contradict their own understanding of the
situation and of their own abilities.
2 Corrections and Denials
Children as young as 16 months of age also use their existing knowledge in order to
correct or deny false statements. In one study, children watched as a speaker labelled
a familiar picture (e.g., a ball) either correctly or incorrectly. When an actor gave
incorrect labels while looking at the objects, 94% of children responded by stating
the correct name, as if they were attempting to correct her (Koenig and Echols 2003;
see also Pea 1982). These findings show that the 16-month-old children rejected
information that was inconsistent with their existing knowledge.
Importantly, children’s developing understanding of the mental lives of the
speakers was also evident in this study. Koenig and Echols measured children’s
looking behaviour when the actor, who either faced towards or away from the object,
named it. Children looked longer when the actor gazed at an object while
mislabelling it, as if surprised that she made the mistake. More interestingly, they
also looked longer when she correctly labelled an object that she could not see.
Children did not simply link the speaker’s label to its referent, rejecting a mismatch,
but also considered the conditions under which the speaker made her statement.
3 Imitation
The sensitivity of infants’ behaviours to indicators of potential informants’ mental
states is also evident in their imitation behaviour. In a classic study illustrating
infants’ willingness to imitate unusual actions, Meltzoff (1988) showed 14-month-
olds an actor who turned on a light box by pressing it with his head (the head
action). The light could have just as easily been turned on by pressing it with a hand
(the hand action). Even after a delay of a week, 67% of the children who saw the
head action imitated it, although no children who did not see this demonstration did
so. These findings illustrate that infants are quite prepared to copy the actions of
others.
Further research shows that children do not blindly imitate but are sensitive in
some ways to constraints on action. Gergely and colleagues (Gergely et al. 2002)
note that even after faithfully copying the head action, infants often also produced a
hand action, pressing the button using the more conventional means. Exploring this
finding, they compared the imitation performance of 14-month-old children who saw
the actor produce the original head action for no clear reason, or saw the actor
produce the head action while her hands were wrapped in a blanket after she said she
was cold. In the original condition, children copied the head action at the same rate
as in the original study. In contrast, when the actor’s hands were occupied, children
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were much less likely to copy the head action, choosing instead to press the box
using their hands, an action that they had not seen the actor perform. How children
imitate appears to depend on the actor’s reasons for acting, or on constraints
governing what she could do.
In situations where social cues reinforce the learning situation, children might be
more prone to imitate. Indeed, Csibra and Gergely (2005) argue that under normal
teaching situations, such as when a speaker intends to provide generalizable
knowledge like a label for an object, the speaker gives clear cues that they are about
to do so. For example, they are likely to make eye contact and establish joint
reference, and perhaps even add verbal cues (“watch this” or “I’m going to show you
something”). In the initial study, when the actor used his head despite having free
hands, children could have reasoned that he chose to use his head instead of his hand
as part of a pedagogical exchange—trying to teach some new and important
information—so they faithfully imitated the action. This interpretation is supported
by a study reported by Gergely and Csibra (2005), in which they compared
children’s behaviour with and without pedagogical cues. Fourteen-month-old
children who watched the actor use her head in an observational learning context,
without any pedagogical cues, were significantly less likely to imitate the head
action as compared to a condition that included the usual pedagogical cues.
Similarly, Brugger and colleagues (Brugger et al. 2007) showed children an actor
who modelled two actions (e.g., undo latch, open lid). In one condition, both actions
were necessary to produce the goal, whereas in another, only the second action was
necessary. Although 15-month-olds were more likely to imitate both of the actions,
in order, when both actions were necessary than when they were not, they were also
more likely to imitate the non-critical action when it was socially cued (“Watch what
I can do”) than when it wasn’t (“Wow, it’s nice outside”). Although imitating
apparently irrelevant and unnecessary actions can be wasteful, a tendency to do so
may also allow children to learn culturally significant rituals and procedures.
All of these studies illustrate that children under the age of two will selectively
imitate actions, evaluating whether the action is relevant and useful before deciding
to imitate. They are also more likely to faithfully imitate an apparently unnecessary
or irrelevant action when this behaviour is presented with clear pedagogical cues. In
order to selectively copy necessary actions, children’s imitation must involve
sensitivity to the actor’s goals and constraints on her actions.
4 Tracking Speaker Inaccuracy
So far we have shown that even young children can evaluate both potential
informants and individual statements, and that they understand something about an
actor’s goals and the constraints under which they act. But the studies considered so
far are limited in that they consider only cases where it is relatively easy for children
to evaluate the likely reliability of an informant or of communication. In many cases,
however, children lack sufficient knowledge of the domain in question to work out
directly whether an utterance is plausible. They may also be faced with informants of
whom they have no long-term relationship. To what extent can children evaluate the
reliability of statements and informants in such cases?
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One way children could evaluate reliability is by tracking the number or
proportion of a speaker’s utterances which have been incorrect. In procedures
exploring this ability, developed independently by Koenig, Harris and colleagues
(Koenig et al. 2004; Koenig and Harris 2005; Pasquini et al. 2007), and by Birch and
Bloom (Birch et al. 2008; see also Jaswal and Neely 2006; Nurmsoo and Robinson
2009b; Scofield and Behrend 2008), children as young as three watch as two
speakers provide conflicting information, usually about the labels of familiar objects.
For each of several different objects, one speaker is consistently accurate and the
other consistently inaccurate. After establishing their history in this way, the two
speakers give new information, usually the label of a novel, unfamiliar object (e.g. a
blue toy made of plastic tubes might be called a ‘blicket’ by one speaker and a
‘fendle’ by the other). In these naming task studies, children prefer to learn the new
word from the speaker with a history of accuracy, showing that they are keeping
track of individual speakers’ histories and preferentially believing the speaker with a
good track record.
As adults we sometimes think of reliability as a characteristic of speakers, using
the number or proportion of speakers’ incorrect utterances as only a defeasible,
rough and ready measure of reliability. When faced with a speaker who errs, we may
reason about the speaker to try and determine why the errors might have occurred.
We may decide that some errors are due to extenuating circumstances and do not
bear on a speaker’s overall reliability or, equally, that some errors are particularly
negligent and strong evidence of general unreliability. Do children also think about
reliability in this way?
Under a lean interpretation of the above findings, children do not think about
reliability in the way that adults sometimes do. Rather than representing the causes
of error and associated mental states, children are biased to reject utterances of
speakers who are more frequently (or who are proportionately more often) incorrect,
much as adults might ignore the chimes of an inaccurate clock without considering
reasons for its inaccuracy. On this lean interpretation, children consider a speaker’s
past outputs as a guide to their future outputs, rather than as a defeasible guide to a
characteristic which is in turn linked to their likely future correctness. On a richer
interpretation, by contrast, children are sensitive to speaker reliability as such and
not only to one type of consideration that happens to be a measure of reliability. This
would mean that they treat the proportion of incorrect utterances as a defeasible
indicator of reliability. If the rich interpretation is correct, there should be at least
some circumstances in which children realise that an incorrect utterance does not
bear on the speaker’s general reliability.
The literature to date, while acknowledging that no decisive evidence has been
offered either way, favours a rich interpretation of children’s behaviour in the
naming task. Under this interpretation, children use a speaker’s reliability to form
judgements about that individual speaker’s general trustworthiness, as a person-
specific, enduring trait. Koenig and Harris (2007) argue that children do not simply
treat a speaker as a provider of ‘good’ or ‘bad’ output, disregarding an inaccurate
speaker without reference to the underlying conditions leading to the inaccuracy.
Rather, a speaker’s reliability is taken as an indicator of an underlying trait, one that
is mediated by that speaker’s underlying mental states (see also Harris 2007; Koenig
and Harris 2005). Birch et al. (2008) acknowledge that children’s behaviour is
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consistent with both rich and lean interpretations of speakers’ errors, but similarly
lean toward the rich explanation for children’s success.
If the rich interpretation is correct, children’s estimations of reliability must be
sensitive to at least some conditions under which speakers err. From an adult point of
view, ignorance is one potential cause of reliability. Interestingly, it does not appear
that children forgive errors due to ignorance, at least in these types of naming tasks.
Nurmsoo and Robinson (2009b) presented 3- and 4-year-old children with a speaker
who erred repeatedly while blindfolded. It is important to note that the game was
designed so that it was clear that both speakers were to take turns providing labels,
despite the blindfolded speaker’s inability to see. At test, after the blindfold was
removed, both speakers gave contrasting labels for an unfamiliar object. There was
no evidence that they excused the blindfolded speaker, even though post-tests
confirmed that they understood the blindfold was the reason for her errors. The same
findings held even when the blindfolded speaker was paired against an inaccurate
speaker who mislabelled objects for no apparent reason. In short, children did not
excuse a speaker who had a history of past inaccuracy due to circumstances that no
longer held. Instead, it appears as though children simply used the speakers’ prior
output to predict their future output, much as one might use a clock’s current
accuracy to decide whether to rely on it in the future. These findings suggest that
children’s predictions about long-term reliability may not incorporate an under-
standing of the circumstantial explanations for a speaker’s errors.
5 Tracking Speaker Knowledge
Although children do not appear to use a speaker’s access to information to explain
away her repeated errors in the naming task, they are sensitive to a speaker’s input in
tasks where they must decide on a given trial whether to believe a speaker’s
utterance based on that speaker’s current information access. In Robinson and
Whitcombe’s (2003) tunnel game procedure, children are shown pairs of toys that
differ either in colour (e.g., a brown or white teddy bear) or hardness (e.g., a hard or
soft duckling). One of the two toys is hidden in a tunnel, and the game is to identify
which one. The hidden toy could be seen through a window, or felt through the end
of the tunnel. Children take turns with an experimenter or a puppet to feel or see the
toy. In this way, one participant could have uninformative access (e.g., feeling the
toy to identify whether it was brown or white) and the other informative access (e.g.,
looking through the window). Again, it was clear from the design of the game that
both the child and the speaker had to provide an answer even when they were
poorly-informed. Three- and 4-year-old children were more likely to believe a
speaker who has had informative access than one who has not (Robinson and
Whitcombe 2003, see also Robinson et al. 2008; Whitcombe and Robinson 2000).
That is, they did not simply believe the speaker, but evaluated whether the speaker
had the relevant knowledge before deciding to believe her.
Interestingly, children are also sensitive to a speaker’s prior errors in this type of
task. Children who witnessed a speaker making multiple errors for no obvious
reason (e.g., she looked at the toy and incorrectly announced that it was brown) were
much less likely to believe that speaker in the future than those who witnessed a
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speaker making multiple errors because of uninformative access (e.g., she felt the toy
and incorrectly announced that it was brown; Nurmsoo and Robinson 2009a). In this
tunnel task, children used their understanding of the relationship between a speaker’s
input and her output when evaluating whether to believe new information from that
speaker. This is evidence that children are not simply biased to reject information
from speakers who have been incorrect in the past.
It remains unclear why children performed well on the tunnel task while failing to
consider a speaker’s reasons for error in the blindfold naming task. This difference in
performance raises some interesting possibilities concerning children’s use of
mentalistic reasoning in tasks such as these. Perhaps children are more conservative
in the naming task because they are learning generalizable information such as
words or object functions. Under these conditions, it may be preferable to minimize
false positives, so they discount utterances of speakers who have been incorrect in
the past regardless of why they were incorrect. When trying to identify the
temporary hidden contents of a box, however, since the information to be learned is
not relevant outside the context of the game, children might be more willing to
accept information from a previously inaccurate speaker when he erred for a good
reason. Another possibility is that children find it easier to judge the knowledge state
of a single speaker, as in the tunnel task, than to monitor two different characters, as
in the naming task. Perhaps the additional difficulty involved in tracking multiple
speakers causes children to fall back to using simple heuristics in deciding who to
believe. Further research is needed to explore these questions.
6 Tracking Speakers’ Beliefs
As children’s understanding of the mental lives of others grows, they become better
able to reason about the long-term trustworthiness of potential informants. Children
could begin with the basic heuristic of avoiding learning from a speaker with a
history of inaccuracy, as shown in the blindfold naming task, and move toward
explaining speakers’ errors in terms of their input conditions, as seen in the tunnel
task.
Some support for developmental change in children’s understanding of speakers
who err is found in Robinson and Nurmsoo’s (2009) false belief study. Three- to 5-
year-olds were shown a series of four boxes, each with a reasonable expectation
about its contents based on its appearance (a small cereal box, a box featuring a well-
known make of building blocks, a DVD case, and a crayons box). Children were
shown the contents of the first three boxes, and were surprised to find that each
container held a small toy cat. After the cats were replaced in their boxes, a puppet
speaker was introduced. The puppet was then given a history of unreliability: he
mislabelled the contents of each of the three boxes. As in the tunnel task, one group
of children saw the puppet make inexcusably incorrect statements about the contents
of the boxes after looking inside them. A second group of children saw the puppet
mislabel the contents out of ignorance, reporting the expected contents without
seeing inside the containers. Again, as in the tunnel task, children who witnessed the
poorly-informed puppet make excusable errors were more likely to later believe that
puppet when he was better informed than were children who witnessed the puppet
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make errors despite being well-informed. The new feature if this experiment
concerned the group for whom the puppet’s errors could be excused by ignorance.
There are two levels at which children could have explained the puppet’s errors. At
the lower level, children could understand that the puppet was ignorant of the true
contents of the boxes, explaining his errors as due to ignorance. However, children
who understand that a speaker could have a false expectation about the boxes’
contents would additionally understand why the puppet made the precise errors that
he did—the puppet expected the contents to match the external appearance of the
boxes. At the end of the study, children were asked to explain why the puppet made
errors on the initial boxes. Those who were explained why the puppet made the
precise errors that he did (e.g., ‘because it’s got Cornflakes on the front’) were much
more likely to believe the puppet when he was subsequently well-informed than
were children who did not explain the puppet’s errors with reference to his false
expectations (e.g., ‘he likes DVDs and he doesn’t like cats,’ or ‘he doesn’t know, he
just said it wrong’).
The results of the false belief study suggest that as children develop an
understanding of the mental states of speakers, they begin to understand more about
the speakers’ errors and are able to use this information to appropriately evaluate the
future reliability of a speaker.
7 Information Seeking
Children are not limited to waiting until an adult initiates an interaction, but can
solicit information from others. Even under these circumstances, however, children
are at risk of being given inaccurate information, and recent research suggests that
children evaluate potential informants before seeking information. In a game
designed to elicit information seeking, 3- through 6-year-olds, together with an
experimenter, attempted to identify which of three toys was hidden in a box. The
players, separated by a small barrier, privately marked their answers on individual
answer sheets. On some trials, one of the players was permitted to look inside the
box before placing an answer. Before giving their final judgment, children were
significantly more likely to look at the experimenter’s answer first by peeking over
the barrier, or by asking the experimenter to move it, when she had seen inside the
box than when she had not (Robinson et al. in press). Even 3-year-old children were
sensitive to the experimenter’s access to the relevant information when deciding
whether to seek this information.
Children also ask questions, and gain knowledge from asking questions, as early
as their second year (e.g., Chouinard 2007). By asking questions, children can direct
their own learning. Interestingly, however, they do not seem to be sensitive to a
potential informant’s access to the relevant information when deciding whether
to ask her. In a game similar to the hidden-box task described above, 3- to 5-
year-olds were to guess the hidden contents of a box. They were permitted to
ask for help from the experimenter, who had seen the contents on some trials.
When the child asked for help, the experimenter would say, for example,
“would you like me to tell you what I think is inside? I think it’s the cat.”
Surprisingly, children were just as likely to ask the experimenter when she had
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seen inside the box as when she had not (Robinson et al. in press). This is in stark
contrast to children’s very good performance when they could look at the
experimenter’s answer instead of asking. Although children seemed to understand
that when the experimenter had seen inside the box she would give an accurate
answer (as seen in the barrier task), they did not use this information when
deciding whether to ask her for her answer.
Overall, children’s sensitivity to a speaker’s knowledge state is less clear in child-
initiated learning. Perhaps as children’s understanding of mental states develops,
they begin to understand how a person’s knowledge can be tapped by asking
questions rather than by simply evaluating her output.
8 Sensitivity to Speaker Bias
Older children share the adult intuition that an informant might give poor
information when they have a bias or a vested interest. For example, a speaker
who makes a statement in accord with his own self-interest may be considered to be
less believable than one who makes the same statement despite it going against his
own interests.
Mills and Keil (2005) presented children with stories in which a speaker had a
chance at winning a prize, and either said he won, or that he had not. In one story,
the protagonist was in a race in which he and another boy finished very close
together. Without knowing who actually won, children heard that the protagonist
either announced that he did, or did not, win the race. Children then judged the
believability of the speaker’s statement. Children aged 7 to 8 were more likely to
believe the speaker when he spoke against his own self-interest (when he said he
lost) and to discount his statements aligned with his self-interest. Similarly, Gee and
Heyman (2007) found that 6- and 7-year-olds were sensitive to a character’s motives
when deciding whether to believe her statements. For example, they were more likely
to believe a story character who said she was sick (and would therefore miss a day of
camp) if she wanted to go to camp, than if she did not. These children considered a
speaker’s motives and bias when deciding whether to believe her statement.
9 Conclusions
Children do not simply believe what they are told, but evaluate the likely truth of new
information by considering the speaker’s informedness, the relevance of her
behaviour, her history of accuracy or inaccuracy, and her access to the relevant
knowledge. Together, these processes minimize the chances of accepting false
information as true, while also decreasing the risk of rejecting true information given
by a previously unreliable speaker or one who does not have the relevant information.
One key issue is the extent to which children’s skill in deciding whether to accept
information depends on biases or heuristics such as disbelieving utterances from a
speaker with a history of incorrectness. We argued that children show some
flexibility, for in the tunnel and false belief tasks they treat a speaker’s information
access as modulating the extent to which inaccuracy is a sign of unreliability. This is
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incompatible with the view that children rely exclusively on simple biases or
heuristics. However, since similar competence was not found in the naming
paradigm, it is possible that this competence is fragile and that children do rely on
simpler heuristics when faced with demanding situations.
A second key issue is the extent to which children can draw on an understanding
of mental states such as knowledge and ignorance in deciding whether to believe a
speaker. We might expect that children’s decisions about whether to believe a
speaker are guided by more complex strategies as they understand more about
mental states. While drawing on an understanding of mental states may allow for
more sophisticated strategies, it may also require greater cognitive resources and
larger risks than simpler heuristics. As noted above, current paradigms do not
provide decisive evidence on to what extent children can make use of their
understanding of others’ mental lives when deciding whether to accept a statement.
On the whole, children’s behaviour appears to be well-balanced. They do not
simply believe what they are told, but evaluate the likely truth of new information by
considering the speaker’s history of accuracy or inaccuracy, under some circum-
stances taking into account the speaker’s informedness. Together, these processes
minimize the chances of accepting false information as true, while also decreasing
the risk of rejecting true information given by a previously unreliable speaker. As
children become better able to judge a speaker’s prior accuracy, knowledge state,
and biases, they may bring these factors to bear in their judgments of who—and
when—to trust, allowing them to enjoy the maximum benefits of learning from
others.
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